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Abstract: Although the “country runs” of the Asian crisis stopped at the Chinese border, their
effects nonetheless included a realignment of real exchange rates and a rise in the risk
premium demanded of investments in China.  To examine alternative Chinese policy
responses, this paper introduces a multi-country, multi-commodity comparative static
macroeconomic model.  Simulations suggest that, although the maintenance of fixed parity
with the US dollar may have been necessary during the crisis, its contractionary effects were
not fully offset by fiscal expansion and they were subsequently compounded by a 1999
nominal wage rise.  A case emerges for increased exchange rate flexibility in the post-crisis
period.
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1China’s Post-Crisis Policy Dilemma:
Multi-Sectoral Comparative Static Macroeconomics*
1. Introduction
The crisis of 1997 led to “country runs” and very substantial nominal depreciations
elsewhere in Asia yet the government of China held fast to its nominal US dollar parity.  Its
comparatively large official foreign reserves, its history of capital controls and its protected
banking system made China less vulnerable than some of its neighbours.  Nonetheless, the
crisis appears to have combined with simultaneous domestic reforms and changes in
macroeconomic policy to retard overall economic growth and increase unemployment.1  The
microeconomics of the growth slowdown and the associated unemployment have been
examined elsewhere.2  Here we extend a detailed framework for microeconomic analysis by
adding elements essential for comparative static macroeconomics.
The use of multi-product global general equilibrium is important in the assessment
of crisis-type shocks because it enables us to capture their international transmission through
both bilateral trade and capital flows.  Moreover, it offers a clearer picture of the
distributional effects of such shocks than do comparatively aggregated macro models.3  We
therefore begin with a microeconomic global general equilibrium model that has its genesis in
GTAP.4  To this base we first add LM relationships to characterise money markets in all
regions.  The consumption-saving choice is represented by a reduced form consumption
equation, direct tax is introduced to complement the indirect taxes already represented and
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 See Meng (1999), Wu (1999).
2
 See, for example, Yang and Tyers (2000).
3
 Several earlier quantitative examinations of the crisis (Adams 1998, Noland et al. 1998 and Yang and Tyers
1999) have used comparative static, general equilibrium analysis but the models did not represent the effects on
both real and nominal variables.
2government spending is made exogenous to facilitate fiscal policy experiments.  Both private
and government savings (or dissavings) are pooled globally and allocated across regions as
investment on the assumption that capital is interregionally mobile at a common yet
endogenous global rate of return that is adjusted for exogenous regional risk premia.
Nominal exchange rates are defined and these may be set as fixed or flexible.  Thus equipped,
we reexamine the crisis period with a view to highlighting the effects of China’s monetary,
fiscal and labour market policy in its wake.  We first assess the so-called “soft budget” policy.
Then we analyse the effects of the 1999 nominal wage rises.  And, finally, we examine the
potentially expansionary effects of devaluation.
In Section 2 a brief review of the crisis and the associated events in China is offered.
The integrated global model is then described in Section 3.  In Section 4 we describe the
construction of the crisis and policy shocks is described in Section 4 along with the
simulation results.  Section 5 concludes.
2. Events in the crisis countries and China
For the most affected Asian economies, and particularly Korea, Southeast Asia and
Japan, the primary real shocks were of two types.  First, as savings fled domestic investment
declined.  Second, nominal exchange rate adjustments precipitated a financial collapse and a
surge in insolvency rates, causing a further short run decline in domestic production in the
affected economies.  In China, a history of capital controls and a protected banking system
militated against a further “country run” and fixed nominal parity with the US dollar was
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 The original model is due to Hertel (1997).  The modified model ,which is the foundation for this analysis, is
described by Tyers and Yang (2000) and Yang and Tyers (1999, 2000).
3retained throughout with the backing of huge foreign reserves.5  This did not mean that China
escaped the impact of the crisis, however.  There were two key effects.  First, nominal parity
with an appreciating US dollar in a period of low global inflation caused real appreciations
against almost all of China’s trading partners, as indicated in Figure 1.  Second, capital
controls notwithstanding, outflows on the capital account accelerated markedly in 1997 and
1998.  Indeed, there was a US$60 billion reversal in net private flows, offset only partially by
a US$30 billion slowdown in the accumulation of official foreign reserves.6  This substantial
increase in net outflows appears to have been stimulated by a crisis-linked rise in the
premium demanded on returns earned by investments in China7 and fuelled by a rise in the
domestic rate of private saving.  This rise in saving stemmed not only from increased real
interest rates in the lead-up to the crisis period but also domestic economic reforms that
increased private responsibility for health, education and retirement expenses.8
China’s retention of fixed US dollar parity tended to constrain its monetary policy,
forcing a progressive tightening.  Its “soft budget” policy, which had been maintained since
the mid-1990s and yielded a fiscal deficit of 1.1 per cent of GDP in 1998, was too
insubstantial to offset the contractionary effects of both increased private saving and tight
monetary policy.  Aggregate demand slowed and the domestic price level fell.  According to
official statistics, growth in the CPI, which had exceeded 24 per cent in 1994, has since
declined each year, reaching –0.8 per cent in 1998.  Officially estimated GDP growth slowed
as a consequence, from the 10 per cent achieved in the mid-1990s to 7.8 per cent in 1998.
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 Prior to the crisis, China’s exchange rate had been managed as a “real target” (Corden, 1993, Zhang, 1999;
Song, 1999).  The maintenance of RMB-US$ nominal parity since the onset of the Asian Crisis represents a
departure from this approach.
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 For a discussion of calculations on which the capital account changes are based, see Yang and Tyers (2000).
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 Fernald and Babson (1999) estimate that this premium rose by about 250 basis points between 1996 and 1998.
8
 For further sources of the reasons for China’s savings increase, see Yang and Tyers (2000).
4Official estimates of the 1998 price level and GDP are widely believed to err on the high side,
however.  Unofficial estimates of GDP growth range as low as just under five per cent.9
This slowdown could be explained either by slower productivity growth or by
nominal wage rigidity in the face of the demand contraction and hence a rise in
unemployment.  In spite of the contractionary monetary policy, total investment as a share of
GDP rose slightly and productive capacity continued to be transferred from the state sector to
the presumably more productive private sector, all of which suggests the slowdown was not
the result of slower productivity growth.  Wage rigidities are not unexpected in China’s
regulated labour market, however.  Official Chinese statistics10 indicate that the deflation did
accompany a surge in real wage growth, both in state enterprises and the private sector, from
four per cent in 1997 to 16 per cent in 1998.  On balance, we conclude that there was a
slowdown in output growth associated with a rise in unemployment.  Strangely, given this, in
an apparent attempt to expand private consumption the nominal wages of government
workers were raised in 1999 by between 20 and 30 per cent.  At the same time, the minimum
wage paid to workers in the private sector was raised 30 per cent.
From China’s perspective, then, the key macroeconomic shocks in the crisis period
were (1) the real appreciation relative to competing exporters, (2) the rise in the interest
premium on investments in China, and (3) the rise in private saving in the home economy.
The associated policy shocks were (1) the adoption of a fixed nominal parity with the US
dollar, (2) the fiscal expansion, and (3) the 1999 rise in nominal wages.  To further examine
both the crisis and the associated policy shocks, we turn to our global model.
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 See the discussion by Fernald and Babson (1999), p 6, and that by Wu (1999).
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 State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Publishing House, Beijing, 1998; State
Statistical Bureau, A Statistical Survey of China, China Statistics Publishing House, Beijing, 1999.
53.  A Global Comparative Static Macro Model
We focus on a short run in which the stock of physical capital is fixed and sectorally
immobile.  Investment makes demands on capital goods sectors but at this length of run it
does not raise the productive capital stock.  Also at this length of run, nominal wages are
sticky downward in some regions (China, Europe, Canada and Australasia) but flexible
elsewhere.  Savings are mobile internationally and investment is allocated between countries
to equate its expected rate of return net of exogenous risk premia.  In the spirit of comparative
statics, although price levels do change in response to shocks, no continuous inflation is
represented and so there is no distinction between the real and nominal interest rates.
The real part of the model is based on our modified version of GTAP.11  As a
starting point, it offers the following useful generalisations: (1) a capital goods sector in each
region to service investment, (2) explicit savings in each region, combined with open regional
capital accounts that permit savings in one region to finance investment in others, (3) multiple
trading regions, goods and primary factors, (4) product differentiation by country of origin,
(5) empirically based differences in tastes and technology across regions, (6) non-homothetic
preferences, and (7) explicit transportation costs and indirect taxes on trade, production and
consumption.
In the original model, each regional household receives all income from primary
factors and indirect taxes on trade, production and consumption.  Its expenditure is then a
Cobb-Douglas composite of private consumption, savings and “government expenditure”.
Private consumption is then a CDE composite of goods and services while government
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 For a detailed description of the standard version of this model, see Hertel (1997).  Our prior modifications to
the structure of the standard microeconomic model include changes to the factor demand structure, the
incorporation of elasticities reflecting short run behaviour and, also consistent with short run behaviour, the
sector specificity of capital in all regions.  See Yang and Tyers (2000).
6expenditure is a corresponding CES composite.12  All individual goods and services are CES
blends of home products and imports.  In turn, imports are a CES blend of the products of all
regions the composition of which depends on regional trading prices.  Savings are pooled
globally and investment is then allocated between regions from the global pool according to
rules that accommodate a range of assumptions about international capital mobility.  Within
regions, investment places demands on the domestic capital goods sector which is also a CES
composite of home produced goods, services and imports in the manner of government
spending.  The differentiation of home products from imports essential to this structure
facilitates the departures from the law of one price that tend to occur even in tradeable goods
sectors in the short and medium run.13
Simplifying only slightly, the standard model has accounting relationships for each
home-produced commodity or service, i, in each region satisfy
i
H
i
H
i
H
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where Yi is domestic output net of intermediate demand and the superscript H distinguishes
home-produced goods from imports.  Since consumption, investment and government
spending generate demand for imports, we can also write
M
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M
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M
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Adding imports in this form to both sides of the first accounting relationship and using the
result in a home price weighted sum across goods and services yields the central accounting
identity
MXGICY −+++= (3)
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 CDE is “constant difference in elasticities”.  It offers non-homotheticity of consumption demand.  See Huff et
al. (1997).
13
 The early literature on real exchange rate changes tended to focus on associated relative price changes where
tradeable goods prices retained parity with international trading prices.  More recently it has become certain that
short run departures from the law of one price occur across all tradeable goods sectors.  See Engel (1999).
7Since the standard structure has income divided in constant proportions between private
consumption, government consumption and collective saving (Y = C + G + S), this system of
accounting relationships implies the balance of payments identity S – I = X – M.  For each
region this sets the current account surplus equal to the capital account deficit.  The model’s
accounting relations therefore make it unnecessary to include the balance of payments identity
explicitly.  We now turn to our modifications to this standard structure.
3.1 Direct taxes and government spending
Our first modification to the model is to make the government financially
independent by incorporating direct taxes explicitly and allowing for the exogeneity of
government spending.  Regional households then receive only regional factor income,
YF=WL+RK, and from this they pay direct tax at a constant marginal rate, τ.  The disposable
income that remains is then divided between private consumption and private saving so that
the regional household’s disposal identity is
PF SCY +=− )1( τ (4)
Government saving, or the government surplus, is then
GYTS FIG −+= τ (5)
where TI is the revenue from indirect taxes on trade, production and consumption.  Each
region then contributes its total saving, ST = SP + SG, to the global pool from which investment
is derived.  For an individual region, relations (4) and (5) still imply that GDP is
GSCTYY TIF ++=+= (6)
and this, with (3), implies the now slightly disaggregated balance of payments identity:14
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 Note that there is no allowance for interregional capital ownership in the starting equilibrium and so there are
no factor service flows and the current account is the same as the balance of trade.
8ISSMX GP −+=− (7)
3.2 Private consumption
The private consumption and saving decision is represented by a reduced form
consumption equation with wealth effects included via a sensitivity of consumption and
savings to the interest rate.  The equation takes the form:
µδ τγ )]1([ −= FYrC (8)
where γ is a constant shifter, δ < 0 is the elasticity of private consumption to the regional
interest rate and 0 <µ < 1 is the elasticity counterpart of the marginal propensity to
consume.15
3.3  Regional investment demand and risk premia
We have opted to use the most flexible approach to the allocation of investment
across regions, implying a high level of global capital mobility.16  It is allocated across
regions so that the proportional changes in regional capital stocks are larger in regions, j, with
comparatively high values of the average regional rate of return on installed capital, rjc.  In
this process, a global “expected return”, rw, is calculated such that Σj SjT = Σj Ij (rw, rjc, πj),
where Ij is real investment in region j and πj is a region-specific risk premium.17  The
investment demand equation for region j takes the form:
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 In the model, this equation represents consumption and GDP at factor cost in real terms by dividing nominal
expenditure on GDP by a GDP deflator and consumption by a CES consumer price index.
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 By which it is meant that households can direct their savings to any region in the world without impediment.
Installed capital, however, remains immobile even between sectors within a region.
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 Before adding to the global pool, savings in each region is converted into US$ at the prevailing exchange rate.
The global saving pool is then allocated among regions for investment, the local currency value of which
depends on the current nominal exchange rate.  Regional real investment is then obtained by deflating nominal
investment in local currency using each region’s capital goods price index.
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where Kj is the (exogenous) installed capital stock, β is a positive constant and ε is a positive
elasticity.  The numerator on the right hand side is the expected unit return on investment in
region j, (1+rj) = (1+rw)(1+πj).  The domestic interest rate, or bond yield, that also appears in
the consumption equation (8), is therefore rj ≈ rw+πj.
Note that our comparative static analysis does not require that the global economy be
in a steady state.  When shocks are imposed, the counterfactual average regional rate of return
on the fixed and sector-specific quantities of installed capital, rjc, need not be the same as the
corresponding expected rate of return on investment, rj.  Embodied in the investment demand
functions (9) is the idea that, even when permanent, such shocks change current incomes and
hence the current size of the global savings pool.  They therefore change expected returns in
ways that depend implicitly on future capital stocks that are flexible as to regional and
sectoral allocation.
3.4  Money and nominal exchange rates
To include the monetary sector in each region we simply add an LM curve.  This
implies that regionally homogeneous nominal bonds are the only financial assets other than
regional money.  Even though there is no interregional ownership of installed capital, these
bonds are traded internationally, making it possible for savers in one region to finance
investment in another.18  The yield on the jth region’s bonds in the single period represented
by the model is the interest rate, rj, defined above.  Cash in advance constraints then cause
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 Since the initial database we use (GTAP Version IV) incorporates no “net income” or factor service
component in its current account, our initial equilibria must do likewise.  This implies the assumption that,
10
households to maintain portfolios including both bonds and non-yielding money and the
resulting demand for real money balances takes the usual reduced form:
φηα rYmD = (10)
where α is a constant, and η and φ are the income and interest elasticities of money demand,
respectively.  This is equated with the region’s real money supply, where purchasing power is
measured in terms of its GDP deflator, PY.
LM: φηα rYm
P
M
m DY
S
S === (11)
where MS is the regional nominal money supply.
Since all domestic transactions are assumed to use the home region’s money,
international transactions require currency exchange.  For this purpose, a single nominal
exchange rate, Ej, is defined for each region.  A single key region is identified (here the
United States), relative to which these nominal rates are defined.  For the United States, then,
E=1 and Ej is the number of US dollars per unit of region j’s currency.  In essence, we are
adding to the real model one new equation, (11), per region and one new (usually
endogenous) variable per region, Ej.19
The bilateral rate between region i and region j is then simply the quotient of the two
exchange rates with the US, Eij = Ei /Ej.  Quotients such as this appear in all international
transactions.  The most straightforward of these in the original model are trade transactions.
There the bilateral exchange rate is simply included in all import price equations, along with
cif/fob margins and trade taxes.  In the case of savings and investment, the global pool of
                                                                                                                                                       
although there are no interregional bond holdings initially, the shocks implemented cause interregional
exchanges of bonds and hence a non-zero net income flow in future current accounts not represented.
19
 More precisely, since for the US E=1, we are adding one less (usually endogenous) variable.  Where nominal
exchange rates are to be endogenous and nominal money supplies exogenous, one additional variable must be
made endogenous, such as the nominal money supply in one region.  Where nominal exchange rates are fixed
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savings is accumulated in US dollars.  Investment, once allocated to region j, is converted to
that region’s currency at the rate Ej.  The third, and most cryptic, set of international
transactions in the original model concerns international transport services.  Payments
associated with cif/fob margins are assumed to be made by the importer in US dollars.  The
global transport sector then demands inputs from each regional economy and these
transactions are converted at the appropriate regional rates.20
As an index of competitiveness the real effective exchange rate is also calculated for
each region.  It is a trade-weighted average of all bilateral real exchange rates in which the
price index used is the GDP deflator, PY:
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where Xi and Mi are region i’s total exports and imports, respectively.
3.6  The labour market:
Without nominal rigidities the model always exhibits money neutrality, both at the
regional and global levels.  Firms in the model respond to changes in nominal product, input
and factor prices but a real producer wage is calculated for both labour and skill as the
quotient of the nominal wage and the GDP deflator, so that w=W/PY.  Thus, money shocks
always maintain constant w when nominal rigidities are absent.  It is in the setting of the
nominal wage, W, that we have introduced nominal rigidities to the model.  A parameter,
λ∈(0,1), is inserted such that
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in the reference crisis shock, introduced later.  There we fix a target change in the US CPI, PC.
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 For details as to the formulation of the global transport sector in the standard model, which we leave
unchanged, see Hertel (1997: Chs. 2 and 3).
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where W0 is the initial value of the nominal wage, Y0 is the corresponding initial value of the
GDP deflator and Λ is a slack constant.  While ever Λ is exogenous and set at unity, the
nominal wage carries this relationship to the price level and the labour market will not clear
except if equation (13) happens to yield a market clearing real wage.  A fully flexible labour
market is achieved by setting Λ as endogenous and thereby rendering (13) ineffective.  At the
same time, labour demand is forced to equate with exogenous labour supply to reflect the
clearing market.
3.7  Database and parameters:
We use the GTAP Version IV database for 1995 and aggregate to the regions and
commodity groups listed in Table 1.  The key parameters in the real part of the model are the
elasticities of substitution between product groups and between primary factors.  Because the
length of run is short, we use the smaller-than-standard elasticities of substitution in both
demand and supply summarised in Table 2.  These elasticities emerge from a calibration
exercise described in Yang and Tyers (2000). The values adopted for the parameters of the
consumption and investment demand equations and the money demand equation are given in
Table 3.  Finally, the assumed-constant marginal direct tax rates, τ, are derived for each
region as the ratio of direct tax revenue and regional factor income.21
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 The GTAP Version IV Database incorporates estimates of indirect tax revenue and of total government
spending for each region.  To obtain direct tax revenue, we drew fiscal deficits for 1995 from the International
Financial Statistics (IMF) and estimated it as total government spending less the fiscal deficit less indirect tax
revenue.
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4. A Reference Crisis Scenario and Three Experiments
We begin with a reference scenario that includes all the shocks associated with the
crisis as well as the simultaneous changes in China.22  This reference scenario is used to
check that the model generates changes in endogenous variables that tell a feasible and
internally consistent story.  Then, having used the model to construct a post crisis database,
we experiment with three policy shocks.  The first is a further fiscal expansion while the
second is the nominal wage rise discussed in Section 2.  The third is a nominal devaluation of
the Renminbi.
4.1 The reference crisis shock:
This shock is an unusual construction in that a number of changes that we would
normally think of as exogenous to our comparative static model are unobservable.  These
include the changes in investment risk premia associated with the crisis and the changes in
consumption/savings parameters in China.  We therefore render these variables endogenous
and introduce shocks to some variables that would normally be endogenous, such as
investment levels, trade balances and nominal exchange rates.  Thus, the reference simulation
serves both to calibrate for some key parameters and to test the behaviour of the model with
respect to those key variables that remain endogenous. In most regions we set nominal
exchange rates as exogenous and impose observed nominal exchange rate changes as shocks,
making nominal money supplies endogenous.  In Asia (which comprises the three identified
regions China, “recessed developing Asia” and Japan), investment and the current account
balance are also exogenous, with observed shocks imposed, while the consumption
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  The real parts of this scenario stem from Yang and Tyers (1999, 2000) who used them to estimate the relative
contributions of the external shocks on the one hand and the internal change (as indicated by the change in
Chinese private savings behaviour) on the other.
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coefficient, γ (equation 8), and the risk premium, π (equation 9), are made endogenous.  In
other regions, we leave investment endogenous while making the current account balance
exogenous.  Accordingly, the risk premium in these regions is also made endogenous but the
consumption behavioural parameters are held constant.  Importantly, since these reference
shocks are restricted to the Asian crisis, they represent an incomplete set for the world as a
whole in the period 1997-98.  The simulations cannot, therefore, be expected to compare well
with observation.  The prominence of the crisis in the Asian regions, however, leads us to
expect the model should do best in predicting changes in those regions.  The specific closure
used for the reference simulation is detailed in Table 4.
The regions most directly affected by the crisis are “recessed developing Asia” and
Japan.  Their treatment is similar to that of the other regions, except that the balance of
payments shocks are complemented by exogenous production shocks with endogenous capital
utilisation, to reflect the high rate of insolvencies and the sluggish resolution of the associated
property rights issues in those regions.23  In China, the levels of investment and the current
account imbalance are also exogenous and shocked as observed in the crisis period.  The
consumption coefficient, γ, and the risk premium, π, are made endogenous to capture the
anticipated changes in Chinese private savings behaviour and the return on domestic
investment.  Government spending is shocked to account for the fiscal expansion between
1997 and 1998.  In China’s labour markets, we assume there is downward stickiness of the
nominal wage over the length of run considered.  Since rigid wages prevail in the state-owned
and urban collective sectors and since workers in these two sectors make up about half the
total wage bill, we set the nominal wage rigidity parameter of equation (13) at γ=0.5.  Also
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because both the markets for labour and skill are regulated, we allow their relative wages to
vary but impose this rigidity on their average value.
The results for endogenous variables are listed in Table 5.  Except to the extent that
nominal exchange rates between all regions are forced to change as observed in 1997-98,
these results indicate only the global effects of the crisis shocks and the contemporaneous
change in Chinese private saving behaviour.  Most striking for China is the larger deflation
predicted by the model when compared with the official record.  Were there no real shocks
imposed, nor any nominal rigidities in the model, the fixed nominal exchange rates would
ensure that all regions experience the same price level change (the US CPI target).  Because
there is upward pressure on nominal wages in the industrial regions that regulate labour
markets, and downward pressure occurs in China, the only active nominal rigidity is in the
Chinese labour market.  The unemployment that results is important for China but it is not
significant in other regions.
The real shocks, however, and in particular those to investment and the balance of
payments, are large for the Asian regions.  They cause large changes in real exchange rates
and, in turn, require substantial deviations in domestic price levels.  Of course, the
magnitudes of these real exchange rate changes depend on the set of elasticities used in the
model (Table 2) and short run values for these are not well backed by estimation.
Nonetheless, to obtain the official change in China’s GDP deflator, we would have needed to
use an elasticity set larger in magnitude than that designed for long run applications of the
model.  We are therefore inclined to suspect that the official statistics understate the fall in
China’s domestic price level in 1998.
As anticipated, the negative crisis shocks contract China’s aggregate demand, the
domestic price level falls and nominal wage stickiness ensures that the real wage rises.
16
Employment falls and so output falls, once again by more than the official statistics reveal.
Investment in China, which is exogenous in this simulation, falls by very little compared with
global investment.24  The loss of employment, however, substantially reduces the domestic
return on installed capital.  Other things equal, the latter would discourage investment.  For
consistency, the model finds that a decrease must have occurred in the investment premium
for China.  This is in spite of a substantial flight of savings!  One difficulty here is that the
rise in overall investment in China primarily reflects a boost in state sector investment,
including inventory accumulation, the demand for which is not reflected by the model’s
equation (9).  Private investment, which is more likely to behave as simulated, actually
declined.  In effect, the result indicates that our assumption of international capital mobility is
too extreme for China.  The very large reversal in private flows on China’s capital account
notwithstanding, in 1997-98 actual mobility in and out of China fell short of the model’s
behavioural representation.
4.2  Post crisis policy simulations
The reference simulation enables us to construct a post-crisis global short run
equilibrium.  This equilibrium takes the form of a global database upon which we then
impose three policy shocks, each independently so as to gauge their separate effects on the
post-crisis Chinese economy.
In these policy simulations, investment risk premia and the behavioural parameters
affecting saving in Asia (including China) are fixed at post-crisis levels and the components
of each region’s current account are made endogenous.  Investment is then allocated across
regions so as to equalise expected rates of return adjusted for the fixed risk premia.  It is
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assumed that property rights issues that had caused capital underutilisation in “recessed
developing Asia” and Japan are resolved, so that the capital specific to each industry in those
regions is fully utilised and sectoral output levels are therefore endogenous.  The worst
immediate effects of the crisis in “recessed developing Asia” and Japan are therefore
removed, though the high-risk premia remain.  Finally, all interregional exchange rates are
assumed to float, except for that between China and the US, which remains fixed.  China’s
price levels are therefore endogenous while monetary policies in all the other regions are
assumed to target two per cent increases in regional CPIs.
Because the shocks in these experiments are specific to China the effects on other
regions are generally small and so, for economy of space, we focus our discussion on the
domestic effects.  These are summarised in Table 6.
(i) Further fiscal expansion, maintaining fixed nominal parity with the US$:
This experiment is to gauge the independent power of fiscal policy to raise output
and employment in China.  The Chinese labour market is characterised by nominal wage
stickiness, with the parameter λ in equation (13) set at 0.5.  The primary shock this time is a
ten per cent expansion in Chinese government spending.
In the standard Mundell-Fleming open economy framework, to which this model
should conform broadly, monetary policy is tied to the fixed exchange rate, leaving it
unavailable to facilitate expansion following negative shocks.  Fiscal policy, however, is not
only available but its power to expand the economy is enhanced in the fixed exchange rate
environment because the crowding out it causes does not result in a nominal appreciation.
Indeed, the Chinese fiscal expansion does raise domestic demand but this also raises the
domestic price level.  At the fixed nominal exchange rate this is consistent with a real
18
appreciation relative to the rest of the world.  Yet overall expansion does occur because the
domestic price rise, combined with the nominal wage stickiness, causes real wages to fall and
employment to rise.
The increased government dissaving associated with the fiscal expansion raises net
inflows on the capital account, causing the current account balance to deteriorate - a result
that is also consistent with the real appreciation.  Increased employment raises the real unit
reward of installed capital.  At the same time, the increased demands of China on the global
saving pool raise the global interest rate and therefore the home interest rate.  The rise in the
return on installed capital dominates, however, and additional real investment is attracted.
This deviates from the “crowding out” story that would be present if savings were less mobile
between regions.
At the industry level, the rise in the real exchange rate reduces export
competitiveness but it also reduces the real wage.  In the export sector, which is primarily
labour intensive manufacturing, the net effect of these two forces is to reduce output.  With
the cheaper labour, however, the relatively untraded services sector expands.  The net result is
a real expansion that does not impair future growth, in the sense that investment rises, but
wherein the cost is borne by unskilled workers, whose real incomes fall.25 26
(ii) Nominal wage rise, maintaining fixed nominal parity with the US$:
Here we examine the independent effect of the 1999 increase in nominal wages.  The
Chinese nominal wage is made completely exogenous (λ=1) and raised 5 per cent.
Government spending is now fixed as a proportion of GDP.  Although intended to raise
                                                
25
 It is assumed here that the increased investment will generate commercial returns instead being added to
unproductive inventory and wasteful projects in the state sector, which often holds large stockpiles of unsaleable
products (Woo, 2000).
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consumption expenditure, this shock raises the real wage and reduces employment and
output.  The expected result is a decline in consumption expenditure.  And this is borne out,
as shown in the second column of Table 6.
The rise in labour costs in all sectors pushes up the domestic price level.  The policy
would therefore have contributed to arresting China’s deflation, suggesting an alternative
political motivation.  With the nominal exchange rate fixed, this raises the real exchange rate,
however, reducing export competitiveness.  And because the nominal wage rise also increases
the real wage relative to the prices of other inputs and factors of production, employment and
GDP both fall.  The government’s stated objective notwithstanding, this causes a decline in
overall household income which reduces both private savings and private consumption.  The
change in private savings is, however, too small to affect the global interest rate significantly.
Yet investment is affected, via an associated change in the rate of return on Chinese installed
capital.  The fall in employment causes the marginal product of capital, and therefore the real
return on installed capital, to fall.  Real domestic investment therefore falls.  In sum, then,
because this policy reduces current output and investment, the benefits it delivers to those
workers remaining employed come at the cost of lower overall private consumption and
slower future growth.
(iii) Nominal devaluation against the US$:
As with the previous policy experiments, China’s bilateral nominal exchange rate
with the US is exogenous.  This time, however,  it is devalued by 10 per cent.  This is in
keeping with the view that the present state of China’s banking sector militates against a
move to either a managed or a free float.  Government initiated adjustments are feasible,
                                                                                                                                                       
26
 Not displayed in Table 6 are the sector specific returns to capital.  As expected, these show that manufacturing
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however, in the manner of the 1980s and early 1990s.  Government spending remains fixed as
a proportion of GDP and the labour market is characterised, as in the case of the fiscal
expansion, as having nominal wages that are sticky downward, with the parameter λ in
equation (13) set at 0.5.
This shock raises the domestic relative price of imports and improves the current
account.   No retaliatory devaluations are assumed to take place in China’s export competitors
even though the effects on output in the other Asian regions are negative and comparatively
serious in recessed developing Asia.  This change in the current account, combined with the
required accommodating home monetary expansion, raises the domestic price level and
reduces the real wage.  Employment and output expand.  The return on installed capital rises.
Again, although private consumption and savings increase, the change in Chinese saving is
not sufficient to alter the global interest rate significantly.  Consequently, investment is
attracted to China by the higher return on installed capital.  All industries benefit from the
reduced real wages with the greatest expansion enjoyed by the more export oriented labour-
intensive manufacturing sector.  In the end, while output and growth are enhanced, these
gains come at the cost of reduced real income in worker households.
It is interesting to compare the final two columns of Table 6.  The five per cent
nominal wage rise and the 10 per cent devaluation have near opposite effects on all real
variables.  Although the latter enhances output and growth while the former contracts them,
the former rewards skilled and unskilled worker households (at least those remaining
employed), an important political constituency.
                                                                                                                                                       
capital owners are also losers.
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5. Conclusion
There is much that can be learned about the effects of investment shocks, like those
that were associated with the Asian economic crisis, from appropriately constructed real
comparative static analysis.  When real flows on the capital account change following such
shocks the associated real exchange rate effects are readily modelled in this way and these
often tell most of the economic story.  Yet an important part of that story is left out.  To the
extent that nominal rigidities exist at the length of run on which such analyses are focussed,
the associated nominal shocks can have substantial real effects.  These effects can only be
incorporated if the model used has a more complete macroeconomic structure.  The extension
of a fairly standard global micro model to achieve this has been the objective of this paper.
We have incorporated simple reduced form behavioural relationships from elemental
macroeconomics and combined them with generic parameter estimates.  For our nominal
rigidity we have introduced a form of nominal wage stickiness, though the range of labour
market behaviours available is very flexible.  A key assumption is international capital
mobility.  In the present version, all private and government savings contribute to a global
pool from which real investment is allocated to each region.  This allocation process is guided
by returns on installed capital and exogenous risk premia for all regions.  Our simulation of
the effects of the Asian crisis showed, among other things, that this assumption is extreme for
our representation of China.  A second key assumption, necessitated by our comparative static
approach, is that no agents in the model are forward-looking.  The overshooting behaviour
that can emerge when expectations are accounted for is not represented.  The model therefore
offers an advance on comparative static microeconomics but one that is tempered by
remaining shortcomings.
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Our application to post-crisis macroeconomic policy in China confirms that, while
maintaining fixed nominal parity with the US$, continued fiscal expansion raises the home
price level and therefore the real exchange rate, harming exports and export-oriented
manufacturing industries.  It does, however, reduce the real wage and foster employment
growth.  With perfect capital mobility, increased government dissaving notwithstanding, this
employment growth drives up the return on installed capital and attracts new investment from
abroad, thus fostering future overall economic growth.  The nominal wage rise of 1999
(approximated as 5 per cent) also raises the home price level and the real exchange rate and
hence it also hurts export-oriented manufacturing.  Employed workers gain at the expense of
those rendered unemployed and of the owners of other factors of production.  Reduced
employment causes the return on installed capital to fall and so investment falls.  Other things
equal, this policy change reduces output, employment and future growth.
Finally, a 10 per cent devaluation is found to have effects that are roughly invert
those of the five per cent nominal wage rise.  The balance of trade, employment, output and
investment are all improved.  Yet the analysis ignores the value to China of the maintenance
of the exchange rate as the nominal anchor.  Moreover, such a devaluation is literally a
“beggar thy neighbour” policy and this is clearly shown in the analysis.  The good outcome
for the economy as a whole (though not for Chinese workers) therefore comes at the risk of
retaliatory devaluations amongst China’s neighbours and export competitors.
Acknowledgements: This paper was presented at the Third Annual Conference on Global
Economic Analysis, Monash University, Melbourne, 27-30 June 2000.  Thanks are due to
George Fane, Meng Xin, Max Corden, Warwick McKibbin, Xiaolu Wang, Xinpeng Xu, E.C.
Hwa, Ben Smith, Graeme Wells, Kevin Hanslow and Kar-yiu Wong for useful discussions
and comments.
23
References:
Adams, P.D., ‘Computable general equilibrium analysis of the consequences for Australia of
the Asian crisis’, Centre of Policy Studies, Monash University, 1998.
Corden, W.M., “Exchange rate policies for developing countries”, The Economic Journal,
103: 198-207, 1993.
Duncan, R. and Yang, Y., “The impact of the Asian Crisis on Australia’s primary commodity
exports: Why it has not been so bad?”, Australian Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, 2000. (forthcoming)
Engel, C.M., ‘Exchange rates and prices’, NBER Reporter, Winter 1998-99, pp 13-17,
Cambridge Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Fernald, J.G. and O.D. Babson, ‘Why has China survived the Asian crisis so well?  What
risks remain?’, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International
Finance Discussion Papers, No.633, February 1999.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/workingpapers.htm
Hertel, T.W. (ed.), Global Trade Analysis Using the GTAP Model, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
Huff, K.M., K. Hanslow, T.W. Hertel and M.E. Tsigas, ‘GTAP behavioural parameters’,
Chapter 4 in Hertel (ed.), op cit.
IMF, World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, October
1999a.
IMF, International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC,
various volumes, 1999b.
IMF, World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, May 2000.
24
McDougall, R.A., A. Elbehri and T.P. Truong (eds.) Global Trade, Assistance and
Protection: The GTAP 4 Database, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue
University, December 1998.
Meng, X., ‘Rising unemployment and the need for social security’. Presented at the China
Update 1999: China After the Asian Crisis, China Economy and Business Program,
Asia-Pacific School of Economics and Management, Australian National University,
1, November, 1999.
Noland, M., L. Liu, S. Robinson and Z. Wang, Global Effects of the Asian Currency
Devaluations, Policy Analysis in International Economics No.56, Institute for
International Economics, Washington, DC, July 1998.
Song, L.L., ‘Exchange rate policy reaction in China: 1980-1988’, Department of Economics,
University of Melbourne, July 1999.
Tyers, R., ‘China after the crisis: the elemental macroeconomics’, Working Papers in
Development Issues No. DI2000-2, Asia-Pacific School of Economics and
Management, Australian National University, January 2000.
(http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/departments/ecoh/staff/tyers.html)
Tyers, R. and Y. Yang, ‘Weathering the Asian crisis: the role of China’, China Economy
Program Working Paper No. CEP2000-1, Asia-Pacific School of Economics and
Management, Australian National University, January 2000, forthcoming in Pacific
Economic Papers, 2000.
(http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/departments/ecoh/staff/tyers.html)
Woo, W.T., ‘China: confronting restructuring and stability’, paper presented at the Greater
China and the World Economy Conference, City University of Hong Kong, Hong
Kong, 17-18 July 2000.
25
Wu, H.X., “Has China’s actual growth been exaggerated by official claims”, Association of
Chinese Economic Studies Newsletter, August 1999, http://ajrcnet.anu.edu/acesa.htm.
Yang, Y. and R. Tyers, ‘The Asian recession and northern labour markets’, Working Papers
in Economics and Econometrics No. 372, Australian National University, Canberra,
1999 (revised March 2000)
(http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/departments/ecoh/staff/tyers.html).
__________, ‘The crisis and economic change in China’, Working Papers in Economics and
Econometrics No. 383, Australian National University, Canberra, April 2000
(http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/departments/ecoh/staff/tyers.html).
Zhang, Z., ‘Exchange rate reform in China: an experiment in the real targets approach’, St.
Anthony’s College, Oxford University, 1999.
26
Figure1:  China’s exchange ratesa
a  The real exchange rate is expressed as eijR=Eij.PiY/PjY, where Eij is the nominal rate in foreign currency units per unit of home currency, PiY is the Chinese price level and PjY
is the foreign price level.  Averaging across countries within the groups shown uses trade weights.  Here the “crisis countries” include only Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, the
Philippines and Malaysia.  Relative to the category “recessed developing Asia” used later in the paper, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam are excluded.
Source: Data are from IMF (2000).
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Table 1:  Model structure
_____________________________________________________________________
Regions Share of world GDPf
1. Recessed developing Asiaa     5.1
2. Japan 18.0
3. Chinab   2.5
4. European Unionc 29.0
5. United States 25.2
6. Canada and Australasia   3.5
7. Rest of world 16.8
Primary factors
1. Agricultural land
2. Natural resources
3. Skill
4. Labour
5. Physical capital
Sectorse
1. All agriculture
2. Mining and energy (coal, oil, gas and other minerals)
3. Skill-intensive manufacturing (petroleum, paper, chemicals, processed minerals,
metals, motor vehicles and other transport equipment, electronic
equipment and other machinery and equipment)
4. Labour-intensive manufacturing (textiles, apparel, leather and wood products,
metal products, other manufactures)
5. Skill-intensive services (electricity, gas, water, financial services and public
administration)
6. Labour-intensive services (construction, retail and wholesale trade, dwellings)
____________________________________________________________________
a Korea (Rep.), Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam Hong Kong and Taiwan.
b China excludes Hong Kong and Taiwan.
c The European Union of 15.
d These are aggregates of the 50 sector GTAP Version 4 database.  See McDougall et al. (1998).
e Share of 1995 GDP in US$ measured at market prices and exchange rates.
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Table 2:  Elasticities of substitution in intermediate and primary factor demanda
Sector In product
demand, between
domestic and
imported
In import
demand, between
regions of origin
In factor
demand, between
primary factor
groupsb
Agriculture 1.8 3.4 0.1
Mining 2.0 4.1 0.1
Manufacturing:  labour intensive 2.7 5.8 0.6
                         skill intensive 1.6 3.3 0.6
Services:            labour intensive 0.9 1.9 0.8
                         skill intensive 1.0 1.9 0.6
a These are group-specific weighted averages across the 50 industries defined in the database.  The CDE
parameters governing substitution in final demand are discussed in McDougall et al. (1998).  Substitution
elasticities in intermediate product demand, and between intermediates and primary factors, are set to unity
(Cobb-Douglas) in this analysis.
b The complete set of original GTAP factor substitution elasticities are listed in Table 19.2 of McDougall
et al. (1998).  The elasticity of substitution within the labour group, between skilled and unskilled labour, is set
at unity.  Households’ corresponding elasticity of transformation between skilled and unskilled labour is set to
negligibility for this analysis.
Source: GTAP Database Version 4.1.  See McDougall et al. (1998).
Table 3:  Key Macroeconomic Parametersa
Elasticity of
     Real consumption to the interest rate, δ -0.10
     Real consumption to disposable income, µb 0.65–0.80
     Investment: (K+I)/K to the gross interest ratio (1+r)/(1+rc) -10.0
     Real money demand to income, η  0.50
     Real money demand to the interest rate, φ -0.10
a   In this preliminary application, most of these parameter values are common to all regions.
b   RDA: 0.7, Japan 0.75, China 0.65, USA, EU, Canada/Australasia 0.8, rest of world 0.75
Sources:  Indicative estimates.
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Table 4   Reference shocks and closuresa
Recessed developing Asia and Japan:
Exogenous:     Regional nominal exchange rate is shocked as observed 1997-98.
                        Regional investment is reduced from 1996 to 1998 levels.
                        Trade balance, X-M, changes as observed.
                        Sectoral production volumes are shocked as observed.b
                        (Full) employment – labour and  skill are sectorally mobile fully employed.c
Endogenous:   Regional nominal money supply.
                        Regional risk premium on current investment, π.
                        Regional consumption (saving) coefficient, γ.d
                        Sectoral capital use, so that capital is idled in contracting sectors.b
                        Nominal and real wages.
China:
Exogenous:     Regional nominal exchange rate is shocked as observed 1997-98.
                        Regional investment as per cent of GDP is raised 3%.
                        Trade balance, X-M, changes as observed.
                        Government spending changes as observed.
                        Sectoral capital use is fixed.
                        Λ in equation (13) with λ=0.5, to reflect sticky nominal wages.
Endogenous:   Regional nominal money supply.
                        Regional risk premium on current investment, π.
                        Regional consumption (saving) coefficient, γ.d
                        Sectoral production volumes.
                        Employment.
United States:
Exogenous:     PC, CPI target of 2% (see footnote 16, Section 3.4).
                        Nominal exchange rates as observed.
                        Regional current account, X-M, changes as observed.
                        Sectoral capital use.
                        (Full) employment.
Endogenous:   Nominal money supply.
                        Regional investment.
                        Regional risk premium on current investment, π.
                        Sectoral production volumes.
                        Nominal and real wages.
EU, Australasia & Canada, and the rest of world:
Exogenous:     Nominal exchange rate changes relative to the US.
                        Regional current account, X-M, changes as observed.
                        Sectoral capital use.
                        Nominal wage, λ=0 (if W would otherwise fall), employment (if W would otherwise rise).
Endogenous:   Regional investment.
                        Regional risk premium on current investment, π.
                        Sectoral production volumes.
                        Employment (if W would fall), nominal and real wages, or Λ endogenous (otherwise).
a In all scenarios, capital is completely sector specific in all regions, so that the rate of return differs
across sectors.  Of the large number of variables that are endogenous in this model, this table lists only
those endogenous variables that are occasionally made exogenous or that are exogenous in some
regions but not in others.
b The approach taken to this, and its numerical consequences, are detailed by Yang and Tyers (1999).
c In recessed developing Asia, the retreat to the rural sector is reflected by a decline in labour
productivity in agriculture of 5% and in increase in land productivity of 2%.
d The capital account and current account must be equal in magnitude and opposite in sign, I-S=M-X.
For recessed developing Asia, Japan and China, these shocks impose explicit contractions in investment
and in imports relative to exports.  The volume of saving then follows endogenously, thus determining
the coefficient γ in these regions.
Source: IMF (1999a, 1999b, 2000); Statistics from web sites for countries concerned, as summarised in Duncan
and Yang (2000).  The sources for China are detailed in Yang and Tyers (2000).
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Table 5:  The simulated global effects of the Asian crisisa
Change in Rec.
Dev.
Asia
Japan China USA EU Canada,
Aust,
NZ
Nominal exchange rate(US$/.), Ei (%) -38.9* -18.8* 0.2* 0.0* -3.4* -10.8*
Domestic CPI, PC (%) 44.7 16.1 -9.4 1.9 1.5 11.3
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) 40.5 15.3 -7.9 2.7 1.7 11.4
Nominal money supply, MS (%) 24.7 9.4 -8.1 3.3 2.0 11.8
Real effective exchange rate, eiR (%) -11.7 -1.1 -2.0 8.3 2.8 0.9
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) -16.4 -8.8 -10.1 0.0 -4.3 -3.2
Terms of tradeb(%) -4.4 -2.6 -0.7 6.0 0.8 0.2
Global interest rate, rw 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Investment premium factor, 1+π (%) 89.9 29.4 -11.5 -6.7 -3.5 -4.0
Home interest rate, r (%) 92.0 30.8 -10.6 -5.7 -2.4 -2.9
Return on installed capitalc, rc (%) 21.1 20.7 -15.7 1.3 0.5 -0.2
Real domestic investment, I (%) -37.7 -10.7 -0.4 9.8 4.9 7.8
Real consumption, C (%) -16.4 -4.0 -22.4 1.3 0.5 0.4
Balance of trade, X-M (US$b) 146* 36* 30* -137* -82* -15*
Real gross sectoral output (%)
      Agriculture 1.2 0.2 -3.4 -0.7 -0.4 -1.0
      Mining -3.9 -2.7 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
      Manufacturing: labour-intensive -11.4 -3.8 -0.5 -1.5 -0.3 -1.1
                               skill-intensive -12.1 -3.0 -2.6 -1.3 -0.6 -0.7
      Services: labour-intensive -11.0 -5.4 -3.4 1.0 0.5 0.7
                      skill-intensive -10.1 -6.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Real GDP, Y (%) -10.2 -5.0 -2.6 0.1 0.1 0.2
Nominal wage, W (%) 18.1 6.5 -4.8 3.0 1.8 11.9
Real wage, w=W/PY (%) -18.4 -8.2 3.4 1.0 0.3 0.6
Employment, LD (%) 0.0 0.0 -5.0 0.0d 0.0d 0.0d
Unit factor rewards, CPI deflated (%)
     Labour -18.0 -8.2 4.6 1.1 0.3 0.6
     Skill -19.3 -8.3 7.2 0.8 0.3 0.4
     Capital 13.5 10.7 -9.7 0.6 0.3 0.0
     Land -17.3 -5.6 -45.8 -13.4 -4.6 -14.5
     Natural resources -19.9 -8.6 -19.3 -6.8 -3.8 -8.3
a Reference closure and shock details are indicated in Table 5.  All variables shown are endogenous,
except for the nominal exchange rate and balance of trade for six of the seven regions and the level of
real investment in the Asian regions each of which is marked with an asterisk (*).
b Change in the value of exports at endogenous prices, weighted by fixed 1995 (base period) export
volumes, divided by the value of imports, weighted by fixed 1995 import volumes.
c Per cent change in payments to capital less the per cent change in the capital goods price index.
d In these cases, real wage rises do not trigger unemployment because the nominal wage is flexible
upward.
Source: Model simulations described in the text.
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Table 6:  Simulated short run effects of policy shocks on the Chinese economya
Change in 10% fiscal
expansion,
∆Gb
5% wage
increase,
∆Wc
10%
devaluation,
∆Ed
Nominal money supply, MS (%) 1.3 0.1 11.0
Domestic CPI, PC (%) 0.8 0.5 10.5
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) 1.1 0.7 10.3
Real effective exchange rate, eiR (%) 1.1 0.7 -0.7
Real exchange rate vs USA, eijR (%) 1.1 0.7 -0.7
Terms of tradee (%) 0.5 0.4 -0.4
Return on installed capitalf, rc (%) 1.9 -4.2 4.7
Interest rate (expected return), r (%) 0.1 0.0 0.0
Real domestic investment, I (%) 0.1 -0.3 0.3
Real consumption , C (%) 0.6 -0.7 0.8
Balance of trade, X-M (US$b) -5.7 -2.3 2.5
Real gross sectoral output (%)
      Agriculture 0.1 -1.2 1.2
      Mining 0.0 -0.1 0.2
      Manufacturing: labour-intensive -0.4 -1.5 1.7
                               skill-intensive -0.2 -1.1 1.3
      Services: labour-intensive 0.4 -1.2 1.4
                      skill-intensive 1.5 -1.4 1.5
Real GDP, Y (%) 0.4 -1.1 1.2
Employment, LD (%) 0.7 -2.4 2.8
Real wage, w=W/PY (%) -0.4 4.5 -4.8
Unit factor rewards, CPI deflated (%)
     Labour -0.7 4.6 -5.0
     Skill 1.0 3.9 -4.3
     Capital 1.4 -2.9 3.2
     Land 1.2 -13.7 15.9
     Natural resources 0.0 -5.6 6.2
a These shocks are imposed on the post-crisis database, achieved following the changes indicated in
Tables 4 and 5.  Note that the exchange rate against the US$ is assumed fixed in all three shocks as are
all consumption/savings parameters and the investment premia emerging from the reference simulation.
All variables displayed are endogenous.
b This is an expansion of government expenditure with revenue from direct and indirect tax endogenous
and where the deficit increase is bond financed.  As in the reference crisis shock, the labour market is
characterised by wage stickiness such that the nominal wage changes by half the CPI (λ=0.5).
c Here the nominal wage completely rigid (λ=1.0) and it is raised for all workers.  Government spending
is fixed as a proportion of GDP and other conditions are as in a, b above.
d The nominal exchange rate is devalued by 10 per cent once and for all, government spending is fixed as
a proportion of GDP and the other conditions are as in a, b above.
e Change in the value of exports at endogenous prices, weighted by fixed 1995 (base period) export
volumes, divided by the value of imports, weighted by fixed 1995 import volumes.
f Per cent change in payments to capital less the per cent change in the capital goods price index.
Source: Model simulations described in the text.
